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I. Introduction
Cooperation and coordination between the financial authorities ― 
including the government, central bank, and the financial supervisor1 
― have been regarded as important for financial stability (Borio et al. 
1999; Financial Stability Forum Working Group on Deposit Insurance 
2001). 
As it happens, the current global financial crisis has driven home to 
the whole world the fact that cooperation and coordination between the 
financial authorities really matter. Although the complete set of lessons 
from the crisis is yet to be explored fully, already evident is a general 
lesson: Systemic risk is important (FSA 2009; The de Larosière Group 
2009; The U.S. Department of Treasury 2009). This lesson lays 
renewed stress on the macro-prudential supervision being appropriately 
grafted onto the micro-prudential supervision.2 Such a process of 
operationalizing the macro- and micro-prudentials requires, in essence, 
strengthened cooperation and coordination between the financial 
authorities, and in particular, between the central bank (macro- 
prudential regulator) and the financial supervisor (micro-prudential 
regulator). 
Some countries have already begun to explore reform measures. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, “ensuring effective coordinated action 
by the Authorities [i.e., the HM Treasury (HMT), Bank of England 
(BoE), and Financial Services Authority (FSA)]” is listed as one of the 
five reform objectives (BoE ·HMT · FSA 2008, p.9). This renewed 
emphasis on interagency coordination is perhaps due, in part, to their 
recent experience of malfunctioning tripartite relationship3 that led 
1
In the paper, ‘financial supervisor’ and ‘financial regulator’ are used 
interchangeably.
2
The micro-prudential supervision takes market conditions as exogenously 
given, and is concerned with limiting the probability of failure of an individual 
institution within a certain magnitude. Financial supervisors have traditionally 
used this approach when they supervise a financial institution. In contrast, the 
macro-prudential supervision takes market conditions as endogenously deter- 
mined, and is concerned with limiting the probability of the systemic collapse 
within a certain magnitude. Central bankers have traditionally used this approach 
when they pursue their dual mandates of price stability and financial stability. 
For details, see Crockett (2000) and Borio (2003).
3
In that incident of coordinative malfunctioning, “[t]he FSA proved a careless 
and supine supervisor and the Bank of England tardy and flat-footed” (The 
Economist 2008, p. 65).
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finally up to the run on the Northern Rock in September 2007. Such 
an emphasis is not confined to the United Kingdom. The U.S. 
Department of Treasury (2009, p. 3) has recently announced its plan 
to create “[a] new Financial Services Oversight Council of financial 
regulators ... to improve interagency cooperation.” In its recent report 
(FSF 2008), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) calls for “[a]uthorities’ 
exchange of information and cooperation in the development of good 
practices ... at national and international levels” (p. 41), together with 
a variety of other initiatives. 
　As far as institutional collaboration between the financial authorities 
in pursuit of financial stability is concerned, Korea has remained 
seriously backward. Although interagency cooperation and coordination 
for financial stability are stipulated by relevant laws, the financial 
authorities there have often proved to be very poor at institutional 
collaboration in practice. Clumsy and inconsistent policy reactions 
reportedly (e.g., JoongAng Ilbo 2008) shown by those Korean financial 
authorities when the domestic economy was threatened by the onset of 
the all-out global financial crisis during Fall 2008, were the mirror 
image of such backwardness. 
Nevertheless, most macroeconomic scholars and financial policymakers 
in Korea have tended to stop short of putting microscopic lenses to it.4 
This paper attempts to discuss how other countries have been doing in 
this area and to suggest, given such institutional backwardness in 
Korea, some ways out of a virtual absence of collaboration there over 
the past decade. Our focus is on domestic dimensions of institutional 
cooperation and coordination in normal times (i.e., crisis prevention) 
rather than a crisis situation (i.e., crisis management and crisis 
resolution).5 We have selected three countries, in addition to Korea, for 
our review. They are the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden, all of 
which have adopted, like Korea, the regime of integrated financial 
supervision for more than a decade. We will look closely at the 
4
In fact, most journal articles (e.g., Kwon 2004) on the Korean financial 
reform have tended to focus on issues of policy substance, but not on those of 
regulatory governance that may crucially relate in some way or other to the 
former.
5 This is because the institutional arrangements and activities for crisis 
prevention in normal times may differ across the countries, whereas the 
protocols for handling the crisis situation tend to be rather stylized, normally 
with the government taking the lead in restructuring and infusing public funds 
into the economy as necessary.
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Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) of these countries for a 
comparative analysis. To the best of our knowledge, such a systematic 
review of the MoUs has never been done.6,7 Accordingly, this paper 
contributes to the literature by providing a timely and important 
starting point to understand how to organize efforts to cooperate and 
coordinate between the domestic financial authorities.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses why coordi- 
nation and cooperation between the financial authorities responsible 
for the financial system are so much valued for financial stability. We 
also explain that reviewing a tripartite (or bipartite) MoU can be a valid 
approach to understanding how the financial authorities cooperate and 
coordinate in practice. In Section III, we look into how the financial 
authorities have so far cooperated and coordinated in each of the three 
European countries. We also discuss how the arrangements of coopera- 
tion and coordination between those authorities compare and contrast 
across those countries. Section IV presents a review of the Korean MoU 
and discusses how the financial authorities in Korea have done the job 
of cooperation and coordination in the narrower area of financial 
examination. In Section V, we suggest some tentative interpretations of 
our findings regarding the supervisory experiences of the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and Korea. Policy implications to Korea are 
also discussed. 
II. Interagency Cooperation and Coordination: A Primer
Having both microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects, financial 
stability is “multi-faceted” in nature (Healey 2001). This is why one 
observes in practice that in most countries the national financial safety 
net is not typically composed of a single element, but of such multiple 
elements as lender of last resort, financial regulation and supervision 
(including crisis management), and deposit insurance functions. In the 
literature, these three elements are regarded as being complementary 
to each other and thus as the standard set for a national financial 
safety net, which is also consistent to the practice across the world 
6
The only exception that we know of is Hawkesby (2000) in which a brief 
comparison is made between the Australian MoUs and the United Kingdom’s in 
the appendix. 
7 The MoUs that are discussed in the paper are available from the author 
upon request.
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(e.g., Hayward 2000; Kim et al. 2002; IMF 2005b; Chung and Kim 
2007). Abstracting from the fundamental issue of market vs. government 
that relates to each element in the standard set, we take this main- 
stream view as given. 
Typically, the financial supervisor(s), the central bank, the deposit 
insurance agency, and the government (usually the ministry of treasury 
or finance), participate in the net, with each being given a unique 
function. Their respective functions are closely interrelated by nature. 
For example, deposit insurance tends to create moral hazard on the 
part of the insured banks, which in turn requires prudential supervision. 
As these differentiated functions involve correspondingly differentiated 
mandates, powers, and policy instruments, institutional points of view 
may differ across the financial safety net participants. In some cases, 
there may appear interest conflicts between them. Hence arises the 
need for cooperation mainly in the form of information- sharing and for 
coordination through checks and balances between these agencies with 
a view to achieving systemic stability finally (Kim et al. 2002; Kim 
2004a, 2004b; Chung and Kim 2007). Note that interagency coopera- 
tion and coordination form part of regulatory governance to the extent 
that it helps with each authority contributing to financial stability.8
Before we proceed to take up reviewing the MoUs of the sample 
countries in the next section, we will briefly discuss the relevance of 
our particular approach of using the MoUs to understand how the 
financial authorities cooperate and coordinate in practice. Recently, it 
has become a kind of fashion for a country to adopt the regime of 
integrated financial supervision in which the single financial supervisor 
is responsible for all types of institutions and markets. That fashion 
often involves separating bank supervision from a central bank and 
having it transferred to a newly set-up integrated financial supervisor. 
As a result, there arise some concerns that “a significant overlap 
between the role of the central bank and [that of ] the ... [integrated 
financial] supervisor ... [should] negate some or all of the reduced costs 
of performing supervision expected from merging [multiple] supervisors” 
and that the “synergies between bank supervision and central banking 
8
Interagency coordination and cooperation tend to be costly in terms of 
compliance cost and institutional cost of regulation. From the perspective of the 
society as a whole, however, coordination and cooperation will greatly reduce 
the structural cost of regulation, so that they will certainly result in a fall in the 
total cost of regulation. For further discussion on the cost of regulation, see 
Goodhart et al. (1998).
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... should be lost” (Hawkesby 2000, p. 121). It is the MoUs that are a 
safeguard device, installed in response to such concerns, “to formalize 
the relationships” between the financial authorities concerned (Hawkesby 
2000, p. 121). It is thus no surprise to find that such an MoU tends to 
be utilized particularly among those countries in which an integrated 
financial supervisor operates outside the central bank. The MoUs can 
be a proper type of document on which to describe detailed procedures 
and specific arrangements that formal legislation usually finds it hard 
to deal with. It is certainly written based on laws and regulations.
The paper takes a de jure approach in the sense that it basically 
focuses on how the financial authorities are required to act by an MoU. 
It is acknowledged that this leaves room for limitations, since what is 
written on paper may not necessarily coincide with what is done in 
practice.9 However, the paper is certainly more than simply a de jure 
approach. Proper interpretation of what the MoUs say requires some 
significant knowledge of the regulatory governance issues. In addition, 
the on-site interviews done with relevant staff in each country in 
question can also be a good source of information with which to judge 
what is done in practice.10 Our de jure approach, appropriately 
combined with relevant knowledge in the literature and the information 
from the on-site interviews, is thus enabled to get at the realities. This 
way, it is judged that the MoUs have been in effect respected and 
observed in Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, whereas they 
9 In this respect, an anonymous referee has been critical of the de jure 
approach which this paper takes. However, the approach taken by the paper 
can be still reasonably justifiable on several important counts. First, such 
country-specific raw data as are compiled as part of the IMF-World Bank FSAP 
(Financial Sector Assessment Program) are not generally available to outside 
researchers, although they can be a good source of information for a de facto 
approach. Thus, a de jure approach may be considered as a second best, given 
a lack of available de facto information. Second, the fact that a de jure 
approach may not be free from limitations does not, by itself, deny the 
usefulness that the approach may prove to bear. Third, a de jure approach is 
often adopted in the literature on regulatory governance (e.g., Masciandaro et al. 
2008; Quintyn et al. 2007). Fourth and as discussed in the text, our de jure 
approach, being appropriately combined with relevant knowledge and informa- 
tion, may bring us closer to the realities.
10 The interviews were done in October 2007 with a set of inquiries sent via 
email in advance to each authority in Norway and in Sweden, respectively. For 
the United Kingdom, an interview was done similarly with FSA staff in August 
2002. For Korea, we have frequently relied on a variety of informed sources 
from BOK and from FSS. 
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have not in Korea.11
　
III. The Experiences of the United Kingdom, Norway and 
Sweden: The Review of General MoUs
This section reviews the experiences of the United Kingdom, Norway, 
and Sweden. These countries have two things in common. First, each 
country has adopted the regime of integrated financial supervision, like 
Korea, in which a single financial supervisor is located outside of the 
central bank that takes no direct responsibility for financial supervision. 
Second, each country has an experience of operating the regime for 
over a decade.12
A. The United Kingdom’s MoU
The tripartite MoU, initially set out in October 1997 by HMT, BoE, 
and FSA, and later revised in March 2006, had been highly regarded 
internationally as the paragon framework of cooperation between those 
authorities involved in the financial system stability, until the run fell 
on the Northern Rock in September 2007. We will review each version 
of the MoU and discuss the recent reform initiatives. 
a) The 1997 Version 
The 1997 version of the United Kingdom’s tripartite MoU made it 
clear that its purpose was to set up “a framework for cooperation in 
the field of financial stability.” It was the first document in the world 
that delineated how the three parties should cooperate and coordinate 
for financial stability. The MoU consisted of three main components as 
follows (HMT · BoE · FSA 1997): 
　
　∙Institutional division of responsibilities between the three parties;
11 The reasons for such judgment will be discussed in appropriate places in 
the paper.
12 According to Masciandaro (2006), 12 out of 91 countries in the world pass 
the first test in fact. They are: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Korea, Latvia, Malta, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. If 
we further apply our second test, 5 out of 12 countries pass. They are: Norway 
(1986), Denmark (1988), Sweden (1991), United Kingdom (1997), and Korea 
(1997). The number in the parenthesis indicates the year when the regime was 
set up in the country in question. Denmark is omitted, for lack of relevant 
information, from the review. 
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　∙Information flows between them; and 
　∙Protocol for crisis management. 
　
First, concerning the division of responsibilities, the MoU stated that 
it was driven by such guiding principles as accountability, transparency, 
avoidance of duplication, and information exchange. The first two 
principles mainly represent regulatory governance, while the last two, 
cost efficiency. BoE was stipulated to “be responsible for the overall 
stability of the financial system as a whole,” whereas FSA to “be 
responsible for the authorization and prudential supervision of ... [all 
financial institutions and for] the supervision of financial markets and 
of clearing and settlement systems,” and HMT to be “responsible for 
the overall institutional structure of regulation and the legislation 
which governs it” (HMT · BoE · FSA 1997). 
Second, information flows were governed by such operational 
principles as avoidance of “separate collection of the same data” and 
minimization of “regulatory burdens on financial firms” (HMT · BoE ·
FSA 1997). In this vein, the MoU articulated the division of labor 
between FSA and BoE and the need for information gathering and 
sharing arrangements between the two. The MoU also stipulated a 
variety of mechanisms for information exchange between FSA and BoE 
including cross-board membership, secondment, mutual cooperation in 
relations with the international regulatory community, and prior 
consultation in policy changes, etc. In addition, the Standing Com- 
mittee, consisting of the representatives from the three authorities, was 
supposed to serve as the main channel and forum for policy coordina- 
tion and information sharing. 
Third, the Standing Committee was given, in addition to its role in 
normal times as mentioned above, a prominent role of managing the 
situation should the financial crisis ever occur. The MoU provided the 
protocol that the Committee was supposed to follow in such an 
extraordinary situation. BoE and FSA were expected to inform each 
other, for consultation, of a possible crisis situation coming. Either 
institution would act as the lead institution “in its area of 
responsibility ... [,] manag[ing] ... the situation and co-ordinat[ing] ... 
the authorities’ response” (HMT · BoE · FSA 1997). Both BoE and FSA 
were charged with keeping the Treasury informed, which should enable 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer to exercise the power of veto over 
support action proposed by both.
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b) The 2006 Version
The initial MoU had been operative for about nine years before it 
was revised in March 2006. The new version reflected the evolution of 
financial markets and institutions in such a way that enhances the 
“response framework for managing both financial crises and major 
operational disruption[s]” (Bank of England 2006). Keeping intact the 
overall framework and context of the initial version, the new one has 
incorporated three important changes.
First, the new version introduced a distinction between a financial 
crisis and an operational one, highlighting how to manage either type 
of crises. Regarding managing a financial crisis, it placed an added 
emphasis on the respective roles of BoE and FSA to “encourage 
negotiations between third parties” from the systemic stability point of 
view (HMT · BoE · FSA 2006). Regarding managing an operational 
crisis, HMT was given a role of keeping ministers well-informed of 
developments for their timely decision making and for “coherence 
between measures taken in the financial sector and the operation of 
public sector continuity arrangements” (HMT · BoE · FSA 2006). The 
unique roles of BoE as the market functioning overseer and emergency 
liquidity provider, and of FSA as the prudential supervisor of financial 
institutions, were expounded, respectively. 
Second, further dwelled upon were the workings of the Tripartite 
Standing Committee in a crisis situation as distinct from normal times. 
It was newly made clear that the chairmanship rested with HMT and 
that the committee was to meet at deputies level in normal times and 
at principals level in a crisis. 
Third, BoE was mandated simply to “contribute ... to the main- 
tenance of the stability of the financial system as a whole” in the 
revision (HMT · BoE · FSA 2006). This was in contrast with its previous 
task of “be[ing] responsible for the overall stability of the financial 
system as a whole” (HMT · BoE · FSA 1997). Accordingly, “the BoE 
mandate of financial stability was apparently shrunk” (The Economist 
2008, p. 65), and the change turned out to be an unfortunate setback 
only later.
　
c) Recent Banking Reform
The current global financial crisis has witnessed the strong case for 
banking reform in the United Kingdom.13 Specifically in our context, 
13
The UK Banking Reform has focused on the following key objectives of 
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there has arisen the need for strengthening the BoE role in financial 
stability and for enhancing the coordination between the three financial 
authorities. As part of the current banking reform efforts, BoE was 
given a statutory objective of “contribut[ing] to protecting and enhancing 
the stability of the financial systems of the United Kingdom” through 
the Banking Act 2009.
In line with this and other legislative changes incorporated in the 
Act,14 the MoU is expected soon to go through a revision.
B. The Norwegian MoU15
As for organizational structure of financial supervision and institutional 
collaboration therein, Norway has had some unique features of its own. 
First, Norway was the first country in the world that adopted the 
regime of integrated financial supervision in 1986, over a decade earlier 
than the United Kingdom. Second, Norway was the first as well to 
produce formal documentation of collaboration, over broad dimensions 
which the fifth pertains directly to the theme of this paper. (BoE ·HMT ·FSA 
2008):
∙“stability and resilience of the financial system” (p. 10);
∙“Reducing the likelihood of banks failing” (p. 11);
∙“Reducing the impact of banks failing” (p. 13);
∙“Effective compensation arrangements” (p. 15);
∙“Strengthening the Bank of England and coordination between the 
Authorities” (p. 17).
14 Related, the Banking Act stipulates that “[i]n pursuing the Financial 
Stability Objective the Bank shall aim to work with other relevant 
bodies(including the Treasury and the Financial Services Authority)” and that 
“[t]here shall be a sub-committee of the court of directors of the Bank (the 
“Financial Stability Committee”).” The Act also introduces a Special Resolution 
Regime which provides a new framework for division of labor between the 
financial authorities for the purpose of resolving insolvent financial institutions.
15
In writing this subsection, I have benefited from a couple of discussions I 
had at Norges Bank and at Kredittilsynet. At Norges Bank, I met with Mr. Arild 
J. Lund (Director of Contingency Planning), Ms. Hilde Øiseth Nordlid (Chief 
Internal Audit), and Mr. Andreas Sand (Senior Legal Advisor) on October 8, 
2007, while at Kredittilsynet I met with Ms. Nina Moss (International 
Coordinator), Mr. Anders Nikolay Kvam (Speical Advisor), and Mr. Emil 
Steffensen (Head of Off-site Supervision and Analysis) on October 9, 2007. At 
each meeting, the Norwegian regulatory governance in general, and the 
relationships between Norges Bank, Kredittilsynet and the Government in 
particular, were extensively discussed. I am quite thankful to those people 
named above for providing me with quite useful information and answers in 
response to my inquiries.
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of financial supervision, between Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 
(Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway), when the two institutions 
wrote, in April 1993, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) a joint letter titled 
“Broader Collaboration between Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet.” Third, 
the MoU has been regularly revised at a 4-year interval since 1993, 
and these revisions show how cooperation and coordination between 
the two institutions have evolved in Norway for the last 15 years, 
1993-2008. In this subsection, we review each version of the Norwegian 
MoU. 
　
a) The 1993 Version
Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet began to collaborate in supervisory 
matters with each other when the Norwegian economy was recovering 
itself from the banking crisis of 1988-1992. The banking crisis 
witnessed the need for a shift toward what can be now termed as “a 
proper balance between the micro- and macro-prudential dimensions of 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements” (Borio 2006). This practical 
need for a shift may have driven the two authorities toward supervisory 
collaboration.
Institutional collaboration was first put under an internal review16 at 
the behest of the parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance and 
Economic Affairs, which recommended “steps to be taken to strengthen 
collaboration and coordination with Norges Bank with a view to 
ensuring Kredittilsynet access to the necessary socio-economic expertise” 
(Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 1997). Considering that Kredittilsynet 
was then perhaps toiling at its task right in the middle of the banking 
crisis that had stricken at the Norwegian economy no more than 
several years after its establishment in 1986, the Committee’s recom- 
mendation seemed to have been made with a view to having 
Kredittilsynet get into its stride through strengthened collaboration 
with Norges Bank. This resulted in the first version of the Norwegian 
MoU that “took stock of the collaboration between the two institutions 
and set out proposals for new collaborative routines” (Norges Bank and 
Kredittilsynet 1993). 
Remarkably, the version stipulated, ahead of the times, that institu- 
tional collaboration aim at cost efficiency in the use of resources by 
16
A working group that consisted of staff from both institutions was set up 
for an internal review of the practices of institutional collaboration. The group 
prepared a report, and on the basis of it, the 1993 letter (i.e., MoU) was written.
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“avoid[ing] unnecessary duplicate work through appropriate 
responsibility-sharing” and “endeavor[ing] to utilize ... the specialized 
skills present in both institutions” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 
1993). Note that such aims have now become a standard part of the 
objectives for supervisory cooperation and coordination between the 
financial authorities in any country. 
In the joint letter submitted to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the 
two authorities encapsulated the following methods and arrangements 
for mutual collaboration that had already been practiced by function 
and by area (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 1993): 
　
∙“[R]egular quarterly meetings between the Financial Market 
Department at Norges Bank and the Financial and Insurance 
Supervision Department at Kredittilsynet”;
∙“[C]ontact in individual cases”;
∙“[W]orking groups ... from both institutions to address special 
matters such as equity capital requirements, interest rate risk, and 
liquidity risk”;
∙Norges Bank’s representation on Kredittilsynet’s Board as Observer. 
In addition, the following areas were listed in which institutional 
collaboration was to be further broadened, systematized and developed 
(Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 1993): 
　
∙“Supervision and surveillance of financial markets and supervised 
units”;
∙“Regulatory framework”;
∙“Method development and studies”;
∙“Competence training”;
∙“Individual applications concerning establishments, structure, [and] 
increase of capital, etc”;
∙Other areas such as “reporting, international activities, and press 
relations.”
　
Taken together, the letter provided a succinct description of the 
collaborative practices between the two institutions by function and by 
area, and a concrete vision for enhanced and extended collaboration 
that they agreed to go forward with. 
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b) The 1997 Version
At the MoF’s request of January 1997 for “a follow-up review of ... 
collaboration [between the two public agencies],” the 1993 version of 
the MoU was replaced by a new one in April 1997 (Norges Bank and 
Kredittilsynet 1997), which judged favorably of the overall climate for 
enhanced and extensive collaboration at the time. 
Newly added to the initial cost efficiency aims was “safeguarding the 
two institutions’ independent roles and functions” (Norges Bank and 
Kredittilsynet 1997). The new version elaborated on how institutional 
collaboration had been in practice systemized and broadened since the 
publication of the 1993 version. As for regular meetings, the review 
described how collaboration through ‘top-level meetings’ and ‘liaison 
meetings’ had been evolving. Top-level meetings were held quarterly to 
discuss various issues of common interest including financial stability. 
Liaison meetings were held in three different kinds ― that is, held 
monthly, bimonthly, and quarterly.17 Of these, quarterly liaison meetings 
deserve a special mention. They were held between Kredittilsynet’s 
macroeconomic surveillance staff and Norges Bank’s International 
Department, being made operative following Kredittilsynet’s launch of 
the new program for macroeconomic surveillance in 1994 (to be 
discussed later). 
Regarding exchange of information, some specific examples of col- 
laborative activities through joint working groups, systematic exchanges 
of memos and reports, joint developments of methodology, or through 
written or oral communications about research results and methods, 
were illustrated. 
The 1997 version also dealt with a couple of the then new areas of 
collaboration as follows (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 1997):
　
17
First, monthly liaison meetings were held “between … the Financial and 
Insurance Supervision Department at Kredittilsynet and Wing II, Financial 
Markets and Payment Systems, at Norges Bank” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 
1997). Second, the financial markets group consisting of participants from 
Norges Bank, Kredittilsynet, and Statistics Norway, was established to meet 
every two months and discuss reporting by the supervised institutions to the 
three institutions involved. In addition to the financial markets group which was 
permanent, there were joint working groups organized on a temporary basis to 
carry out collaborative projects. The institutional division of labor in this area 
was made between Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet since 1996 when the former 
took “technical responsibility for the database” whereas the latter “[was charged 
with] framing and updating regulations” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 1997).
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∙“Macroeconomic analysis and monitoring financial stability”; 
∙“Payment and settlement systems.”
　
As for the first new area, bilateral collaboration had already been 
made systematically. Norges Bank, being “represented on the external 
reference group,” provided technical assistance for Kredittilsynet when 
the latter “drew up a programme for macroeconomic surveillance” in 
1994 (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 1997). In fact, this new program 
was none other than what is now known as ‘macro-prudential’ supervi- 
sion.18 Notably, it was Norges Bank that assisted Kredittilsynet in 
becoming the world’s first financial supervisor with the macro- 
prudential perspective formally built-in. This was a historic event that 
tells the high-quality and open-minded communications between the 
two authorities. Upon installation of the program, collaboration in this 
area took the form of “exchange of reports, discussion on method 
development, briefings on ongoing and planned projects, etc.” (Norges 
Bank and Kredittilsynet 1997). As for payment and settlement systems, 
suggested was the need for “greater clarification of how responsibilities 
... [were] to be shared between the two institutions” (Norges Bank and 
Kredittilsynet 1997). At the time of the 1997 review, specific legislative 
and practical preparations were under way in recognition of the need 
felt in this area.
　
c) The 2001 Version 
This version was apparently drawn up voluntarily on the part of 
both authorities in March 2001. It consisted of two main parts, one for 
a synopsis of how the two institutions had cooperated meanwhile and 
the other for a description of the then recent, further collaborative 
developments.
As for regular meetings, there were two types of them as before ― 
‘meetings of the executive management’ (previously ‘top-level meetings’) 
and ‘liaison meetings.’ Collaboration in some areas merits discussion. 
First, payments systems were an area in which collaboration was newly 
intensified between the two institutions. As each institution was given 
a clearly differentiated mandate in this area by the Act relating to 
18
Although the term has now become a buzzword within the policy circles, it 
did not find its proper place in the literature at that time. Only later, perhaps 
around the turn of the 21th century, the term began to be found in the articles 
produced by some BIS economists such as A. Crockett and C. Borio.
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Payment Systems, etc. of 1999,19 the two authorities made further 
clarifications regarding their institutional division of labor and described 
how they were cooperative in interpreting the Act, sharing relevant 
information, and in developing expertise. 
Second, there were a couple of areas which reasonably experienced a 
reduction in collaboration. As its resource allocation was, in an effort 
made to avoid unnecessary overlaps of work between the two, oriented 
more towards financial stability, Norges Bank began to be involved in 
reviewing only those applications from the largest, but not all, financial 
institutions regarding licenses and approvals before decisions were 
finally taken by Kredittilsynet. The other area of reduced collaboration 
was press relations, in which it proved that “[w]ith a very few 
exceptions, it [had] ... not been found expedient to develop joint 
information arrangements” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 2001). 
Third, newly highlighted was collaboration in a couple of new areas 
such as contingency and Nordic financial conglomerates. As for 
contingency, Kredittilsynet and Norges Bank collaborated on several 
programs bilaterally or multilaterally with other institutions. As for 
Nordic financial conglomerates, “a need for close cooperation and 
exchange of information between the supervisory authorities and the 
central banks of the countries involved” was raised and the cross- 
border supervisory initiatives and activities were described (Norges 
Bank and Kredittilsynet 2001). 
Finally, collaboration remained active in all other areas. For example, 
in the area of methodology and reporting activities, Kredittilsynet’s 
“loan figures obtained from banks” were linked in autumn 1998 to 
Norges Bank’s SEBRA database and its methodology of risk classifica- 
tion (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 2001). This provided a nice 
example that showed how the specialized expertise of each institution 
was optimally combined and effectively utilized to launch a joint 
project. Also in the area of financial stability, the tripartite meetings 
(i.e., the two authorities plus MoF) at the departmental level were held 
to discuss financial stability reports drawn up biannually by Norges 
Bank and by Kredittilsynet.20 Other forms of collaboration such as 
19
“Kredittilsynet [was] ... responsible for the customer-oriented parts of the 
payment systems (systems for payment services), while Norges Bank [was] ... 
responsible for authorising and supervising interbank payment systems” (Norges 
Bank and Kredittilsynet 2001).
20 Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet each began to produce a biannual report 
on financial stability in 1995. The author learned from the interviews with staff 
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discussion of results, methodology, and of current and future projects, 
continued to be made in this area through both upper- and lower-level 
regular meetings.  
　 
d) The 2005 Version
Now we are ready to review the current version of the Norwegian 
MoU. At the MoF’s request of October 2005, the two authorities drew 
up the joint report in December 2005. The report was prepared in a 
follow-up response to the IMF-World Bank FSAP work (IMF 2005a).21 
Note that the report was written in an explicit awareness of the then 
recent EU agreement, which was about the division of labor, with 
financial stability and crisis management in mind, between the 
supervisors, the central banks, and the finance ministries in the 
European Union.22 Encouraged by the EU agreement and the FSAP 
work, the two institutions, in their cover letter of the report, requested 
MoF to endorse the EU agreement, and recommended that MoF “should 
... consider establishing the necessary national structures for a closer 
tripartite cooperation between Norges Bank, Kredittilsynet and the 
Ministry of Finance” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 2005a). They 
went on to propose that the regular tripartite meetings be held at least 
biannually with the MoF chairmanship. It seems quite extraordinary 
that it was the two institutions, but not MoF, that initiated such a 
move voluntarily. Their proposal touched off the tripartite cooperation 
that finally began in 2006. MoF, Kredittilsynet, and Norges Bank have 
since met as a forum twice a year to discuss financial stability outlook 
and crisis management and to evaluate contingency arrangements and 
of Norges Bank and of Kredittilsynet that every financial stability report issued 
by each authority had been subject to tripartite discussions all along since 
1995. Norges Bank had the report published in its Economic Bulletin since 1997 
until it began to publish the separate report in 2000. Kredittilsynet had the 
report produced biannually and circulated only for internal discussion within 
Kredittilsynet, Norges Bank, and MoF until it began to publish the report 
annually in 2003. 
21
IMF (2005a, p. 6) recommended that Norway “[f]ormalize ... regular high- 
level meetings between FSAN[Kredittilsynet], MoF, and NB[Norges Bank] on 
financial stability issues, and consider establishing a formal tripartite financial 
stability MoU on respective roles and responsibilities.”
22 It refers to “The Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation between 
the EU Banking Supervisors, Central Banks, and Finance Ministries of the 
European Union in Financial Crisis Situations,” which was concluded in May 
2005. This MoU was recently updated in June 2008. See ECOFIN Council 
(2008).
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related measures (Norges Bank 2007). 
Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet provided in the report a clear, 
detailed description of the tripartite roles and responsibilities concerning 
financial stability, in addition to an updated stocktaking of their 
collaborative works. Regarding the division-of-labor part, MoF is 
defined to have “the overall responsibility for ensuring that Norway’s 
financial industry functions smoothly” and to play the role “in 
coordinating the activities of the three institutions in the event of a 
financial crisis” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 2005b). The aims and 
responsibilities of Kredittilsynet and of Norges Bank are defined in 
parallel under each of the following three identical main areas of work 
(Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 2005b):
　
∙“Preventing financial instability”; 
∙“Monitoring risks to financial stability”; and 
∙“Crisis management.” 
　
This way of defining each institution’s aims and responsibilities 
under the same set of main areas of work is unique. It reflects the idea 
that the two institutions’ tasks are not only differentiated to some 
extent but also closely interrelated with overlaps in their responsibilities 
relating to financial stability. It also reflects the fact that they pursue 
to make explicit efforts to elevate their division of labor practically to a 
considerably sophisticated level. This unique feature of the Norwegian 
MoU is certainly expected to contribute to highly efficient and effective 
collaboration between both institutions. 
Regarding an updated part of institutional cooperation, it illustrates 
the general methods of institutional cooperation as follows (Norges Bank 
and Kredittilsynet 2005b): 
　
∙“[E]xchange of information on an ongoing basis”; 
∙“[E]fficient division of tasks”; and 
∙“[J]oint development of expertise.”  
　
The report then elaborates, area by area, on how the two institutions 
had cooperated. The aspects of cooperation described for each area 
remain roughly the same as before. Note that the 2005 version provides a 
rich set of examples of a specific event or project which embodies efforts 
of both authorities to collaborate with each other. Note also that 
institutional cooperation has been intensified particularly in the area of 
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‘crisis management and contingency planning.’ 23 
C. The Swedish MoU24
In Sweden, institutional collaboration between Finansinspektionen 
(Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) and Sveriges Riksbank was 
first formalized by the MoU concluded in February 2003. It was later 
revised in June 2005. We examine each version below. 
a) The 2003 Version
Relevant laws, international agreements and the supervisory practice 
were the sources that had helped define the Swedish framework of 
supervisory cooperation and coordination before they were first put 
together into the 2003 version of the Swedish MoU. The aims of the 
Swedish MoU were to clarify the division of responsibilities and to 
promote cooperation between Finansinspektionen and Sveriges Riksbank. 
As for division of responsibilities, Sveriges Riksbank was charged 
with “a general oversight of the financial system as a whole with the 
main focus on the largest banks and clearing organizations ... [and 
with] emergency liquidity assistance [i]n the event of serious threats to 
the payment system,” while Finansinspektionen with “regularly 
monitoring and analyzing developments in the financial sector ... to 
identify risks at an early stage and detect any signs of financial 
instability, ... conducting supervision of individual financial companies, 
marketplaces and clearing organizations, ... [issuing or revoking ] 
23
A variety of contingency exercises had been done either by Norges Bank 
and Kredittilsynet or by the two institutions plus others. Kredittilsynet was 
supposed to follow the procedures for alerting Norges Bank, as stipulated in the 
Bank Guarantee Act, upon knowledge of a financial institution’s liquidity or 
solvency being threatened. The roles to be played by Norges Bank in such a 
situation were specified in 2004. 
24 In writing this subsection, I have benefited from a couple of discussions I 
had at Sveriges Riksbank and at Finansinspektionen. At Sveriges Riksbank, I 
met with Ms. Malin Alpen (Head of Financial Infrastructure Division), Mr. Johan 
Molin (Adviser to Financial Stability Department) and Mr. Pär Torstensson 
(Policy and Analysis Division) on October 11, 2007, while at Finansinspektionen 
I met with Mr. Eric Wolrath (Senior Investigator) on October 11, 2007. At each 
meeting, the Swedish regulatory governance in general, and the relationships 
between Sveriges Riksbank, Finansinspektionen and the Government in particular, 
were extensively discussed. I am quite thankful to those people named above for 
providing me with quite useful information and answers in response to my 
inquiries.
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[l]icenses and [taking] sanctions ... and [i]ssuing regulations ...” 
(Finansinspektionen and the Sveriges Riksbank 2003).
According to the MoU, the explicit recognition of the inevitable 
overlap in the tasks of the two authorities led them to cooperate with 
each other in gathering and exchanging information and in reducing 
their duplication of work as well as the reporting cost of the supervised 
institutions. The MoU stipulated that the two authorities have routines 
for information exchange and for information sharing in case of each 
authority making an international contact. Further, it encouraged the 
two authorities to utilize their joint competence by way of sharing 
expertise and experience in their analysis of the issues in financial 
stability and efficiency.
As for regular contacts between the two, the MoU stated that there 
were four consultation groups, in which one group consisted of 
Finansinspektionen’s Director General and Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive 
Board member responsible for financial stability. This group was 
supposed to meet at least biannually, discussing financial stability 
issues and making an annual review of division of responsibilities and 
cooperation between them. Note that the group was responsible for 
updating the MoU. Each of the remaining three groups consisted of 
directors from both authorities responsible for payment systems, 
banking stability, and financial statistics, respectively. These regular 
contacts made at both top and staff levels were believed to promote a 
culture of mutual cooperation and to help maximize the supervisory 
efficiency. 
Finally, some general protocols for crisis management were explicitly 
covered in the MoU. The two authorities were supposed to hold joint 
crisis exercises in normal times, and to inform the other of a possible 
threat if detected. As the lender of last resort, Sveriges Riksbank was 
expected to seek, before making its final decision, assistance from 
Finansinspektionen in assessing a request, if any, for an emergency 
liquidity assistance.
　
b) The 2005 Version
The 2003 version of the MoU was replaced by the June 2005 
version, which was in fact a national parallel to the EU agreement of 
May 2005.25 The new MoU took the form of the tripartite agreement, 
25 This refers to “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the 
Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European 
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unlike the old bipartite one. Incorporating the aims stated earlier, the 
current version restated its purpose: “[T]o establish guidelines for 
cooperation and information sharing between the three parties in the 
areas of financial stability and crisis management.” 
It comprises two main sections. The first section focuses only on the 
tripartite cooperation, specifying the roles and functions of each of the 
three parties ― the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Finansinspektionen, 
and Sveriges Riksbank ― both in times of a crisis situation and in 
normal times. It deals with the issues in financial stability and crisis 
management. Note that MoF is assigned the responsibility for the 
financial sector legislation and, in a crisis situation, “the power to 
initiate and implement ... measures” over and above those available to 
either Finansinspektionen or Sveriges Riksbank (The Swedish Ministry 
of Finance, Sveriges Riksbank and Finansinspektionen 2005). On the 
other hand, the second section focuses only on the bipartite cooperation. 
Given that there are some unavoidable overlaps in their activities, it 
elaborates further on the institutional division of responsibilities and 
on the procedures for cooperation between Finansinspektionen and 
Sveriges Riksbank. 
Tripartite information sharing is emphasized for efficient crisis 
management. When a party detects a possible threat to financial 
stability, it should provide others with the relevant information, its 
assessment of it, and its suggested measures. In normal times, each 
party should promote its crisis preparedness, for instance, through 
collaborating with other parties to develop a common position in 
international work. 
In particular, the tripartite consultation group deserves a special 
mention. It has been newly created to replace the bipartite one and to 
enable and ensure consultation and information sharing among the 
three parties. The group is also to evaluate the tripartite cooperation. 
As a device for tripartite communication, it was to meet quarterly and 
whenever any member saw it necessary. “[C]alling meetings, [setting 
up] agendas and [taking care of ] minutes” are to be done on a rotating 
basis between the three parties (The Swedish Ministry of Finance, 
Sveriges Riksbank and Finansinspektionen 2005), although Sveriges 
Riksbank is widely recognized as the group leader in normal times.26 
Union in Financial Crisis Situations.”
26 This is based on a remark made by staff from Sveriges Riksbank during 
the author's interview.
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The tripartite consultation group is to be supported by a non-executive 
drafting group. 
The relationships between Finansinspektionen and Sveriges Riksbank 
and all the arrangements for their collaboration have remained the 
same as described in the 2003 version. In addition, each authority is 
now supposed to consult its forthcoming major policy change with the 
other, which implies that the transparency principle works well in 
practice between them.27
　 
D. General MoUs of the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden: 
An Assessment
We have reviewed the various versions of the general MoUs28 agreed 
between the financial authorities in the United Kingdom, Norway, and 
Sweden, respectively. Now we are ready to make some general points 
regarding how the MoUs and thus the features of institutional 
collaboration are compared and contrasted across these countries.
First, each MoU serves the same purpose of providing a framework 
for institutional cooperation. Such a framework has been designed 
mainly from the perspective of cost efficiency and regulatory gover- 
nance.29
Second, all the current versions of the MoUs discuss the roles of 
each of the three financial authorities including the central bank, 
financial supervisor, and the government (HMT/MoF). This is the case 
even with the Norwegian MoU which is bipartite in form. The roles of 
each financial authority, as stated in the MoUs, suggest that they are 
rather stylized to some extent. In a word, the central bank is to provide 
a macro-prudential perspective, whereas the supervisory authority a 
micro-prudential one. MoF takes up the leading role in the manage- 
27 The Scandinavian countries have been noted for their political culture that 
cherishes transparency and openness. See Taylor and Fleming (1999) and 
Section V of this paper. 
28
The paper distinguishes between a general MoU and a special one, 
depending on whether its scope is broader or narrower. That is, a general MoU 
is when it covers various areas of institutional collaboration, whereas a special 
MoU is when it covers a specific area. 
29 As for cost efficiency, all the MoUs reviewed make it explicit from the 
outset that collection of duplicate data and information must be avoided and 
that regulatory burdens and disruptions on financial firms must be minimized. 
As for governance, such features as accountability, transparency, integrity, and 
independence are embedded, explicitly or implicitly, into all the MoUs.
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ment and resolution of the crisis, while its presence is not very visible 
in normal times when the central bank and the supervisory authority 
are supposed to collaborate with each other in pursuit of crisis 
prevention. In detail, there are certain differences, visible or nuanced, 
in their respective roles across the countries, however. 
Third, as far as institutional collaboration is concerned, more weight 
has been given to the formal workings of the tripartite group in the 
United Kingdom, whereas a variety of less formal interactions between 
the central bank and the financial supervisor have been more intensely 
exploited both in Norway and in Sweden. By less formal interactions, 
the activities through joint projects, joint working groups, and regular 
meetings at directors level, etc., are meant.30 Apart from the tripartite 
standing committee, the United Kingdom operates no joint committees 
or meetings between the central bank and the financial supervisor. 
Note further that the cross-board membership and the secondment of 
staff have been used between BoE and FSA in the United Kingdom 
whereas no such formal arrangements have been instituted either in 
Norway or in Sweden. 
Related to this last point, Norway deserves a special attention. Our 
probe into each of the four versions of the Norwegian MoU in a 
chronological order reveals that institutional collaboration has continued 
to be adjusted, enriched, and enhanced for the last 15 years, in terms 
of its modes and contents, in response to the ever-accelerating changes 
in financial institutions, products, markets, and financial infrastruc- 
ture.31 These developments have been clearly incorporated in each 
version of the Norwegian MoU, as some areas of cooperation and coor- 
dination emerged while others submerged over time. That is, each version 
30
Both Norwegian and Swedish MoUs attach greater importance to the 
effectiveness of institutional collaboration, i.e., to the synergies from the optimal 
use of specialist expertise that their respective central banks and supervisory 
authorities have. The practical and substantial aspect of institutional collaboration 
as reflected in the Norwegian and the Swedish MoUs is perhaps related, in one 
way or other, to the fact that the tradition of Scandinavian civil law has been 
prevailing in the region for long. See the last section of the paper for details.
31 As a result, Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet have been increasingly 
collaborating since the mid-1990s in such areas as ‘macroeconomic analysis 
and monitoring financial stability’ and ‘payment and settlement systems.’ 
Collaboration for ‘crisis management and contingency planning’ has been active 
as well since the turn of the current century. On the other hand, both ‘matters 
concerning individual financial institutions’ and ‘external information(press 
relations)’ were among those areas in which collaboration proved to matter only 
to some limited extent.
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of the Norwegian MoU provides an update that shows how institutional 
collaboration has further developed in practice since the preceding 
version was drawn up. This feature implies that in Norway the practice 
has been incorporated into the MoUs, rather than the reverse, and that 
collaboration has been more about substance and practice than about 
form and procedure.32 An important factor that has underlain this 
Norwegian substance-over- form approach is that the two authorities, 
being with “no statutory restriction on the exchange of information 
[with each other]” (Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet 2005b),33 have been 
free to “share any piece of information upon request” (italics added). 
Although the Swedish MoU appeared as late as 2003, there has 
since been a substantial catch-up in both formalizing and substantiating 
institutional collaboration as discussed earlier in the paper. Sweden 
also seems to have put substance and practice before form and 
procedure to a considerable extent. For example, Sveriges Riksbank 
and Finansinpektionen were involved in performing the stress-testing 
exercises a few years ago. They often hold ad-hoc seminars for both. It 
is notable that, even before the Swedish MoU came into existence, IMF 
(2002, p. 72) mentioned on the basis of its FSAP work for Sweden as 
follows: “There is a very high level of transparency in financial 
supervisory policies and practices in Sweden.” This is a piece of 
circumstantial evidence in support of the idea that the practice has 
been incorporated into the MoUs in Sweden as well.34
32
These points relate to why the paper judges that the Norwegian MoU has 
been respected and observed in practice. It is the practice that has led to the 
revision of the MoU. The author's interviews done with the relevant authorities 
also confirm these important points. In addition, the author learned from the 
interviews that the then recent examples of joint development of expertise 
between Kredittilsynet and Norges Bank included developing relevant legal 
structure for crisis management, holding joint competence-enhancing seminars, 
operating a common training course for newly hired people at both authorities, 
and working on how Norway should adjust the current financial system to the 
EU Directives, etc. There were joint annual research projects as well, concerning, 
say, operational risks in payment and settlement systems from a consumer 
protection perspective. 
33 Mr. Arild J. Lund of Norges Bank has emphasized this feature in his recent 
correspondence with the author in July 2009. In particular, the Financial 
Supervision Act (Section 7) stipulates that “[t]he duty of confidentiality ... does 
not apply to disclosure of information to Norges Bank.” The Norges Bank Act 
(Section 12) stipulates to the same effect as well.
34 We will also note later that Sweden shares with Norway both the same 
Scandinavian legal tradition and the same political culture of openness and 
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The case of the United Kingdom is different, however. There, institu- 
tional collaboration as embodied in a couple of versions of the tripartite 
MoU, has been the form-over-substance approach as discussed earlier. 
In a sense, the UK tripartite MoU provides a commitment rather than 
an update. This aspect seems to relate to the fact that the UK’s 
financial authorities have a much shorter history of formally practicing 
financial supervision.35 The UK’s short history of formal financial 
supervision and its form-over-substance approach notwithstanding, 
both the relevant literature and the interviews done with the FSA staff 
strongly suggest that the MoUs have been respected and observed in 
practice.36
Regulatory governance aspects regarding each version of the Norwegian 
MoU deserve a special attention as well. Since the Norwegian 
Parliament helped both Norges Bank and Kredittilsynet initiate an 
internal review of institutional collaboration for the first time in 1993, 
three additional reviews have so far been done at regular intervals of 
four years, with each review formally carried out at the request of Mo
F.37 In this respect, it is both the Norwegian Parliament and the 
transparency. Accordingly, we may well judge that the Swedish MoU has been 
respected and observed in practice.
35 In the United Kingdom, banking supervision was formalized no more than 
three decades ago, whereas financial supervision only twelve years ago after all. 
BoE, having supervised the banks informally for long, was formally mandated to 
take care of banking supervision only with the 1979 revision of the Banking 
Act. A variety of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), together with some 
government agencies, had been informally supervising the insurance companies, 
the securities firms, and the markets until the new formal regime of integrated 
financial supervision was adopted in 1997. See Kim (2002) for details. On the 
other hand, the Scandinavian governments had begun to organize and administer 
financial supervision formally since early in the 20th century (Ecklund and 
Knutsen 2001).
36 According to the IMF assessment, for example, that was made on the basis 
of its FSAP work for the United Kingdom (IMF 2003a, p.12), “The authorities’ 
[i.e., both the FSA and the BoE’s] strong commitment to policy transparency is 
reflected in the assessments of a very high degree of observance of the IMF 
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Polices.” Note 
that the IMF Code deals with, in addition to other issues, “clarity of roles, 
responsibilities, and objectives of financial agencies responsible for financial 
policies,” which includes “formal arrangements for cooperation and exchange of 
information among various supervisory agencies” and other sub-items (IMF 
2005b, p. 247).
37
The only exception was when the review was done in 2001 apparently 
voluntarily with no formal request coming from the MoF. Note however that 
each and every version of the Norwegian MoU has taken the form of a letter 
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Ministry of Finance that has had decisive influence on Norges Bank 
and Kredittilsynet’s excellent tradition of institutional cooperation and 
coordination. Notably, neither the Norwegian Parliament nor MoF has 
ever imposed any specific guidelines ex-ante on how Norges Bank and 
Kredittilsynet are supposed to collaborate with each other, or has ever 
publicly commented ex-post on versions of the MoUs between the two. 
Instead, both authorities have been allowed to cultivate collaborative 
efforts on their own in pursuit of “inter-agency accountability” (Hayward 
2000) in the broad field of financial stability. This unique political and 
administrative atmosphere is another factor that has contributed to the 
Norwegian substance-over-form approach to interagency collaboration. 
In Sweden, Finansinspektionen had its governance structure 
restructured with the agreement of the Swedish MoU between Sveriges 
Riksbank and Finansinspektionen in February 2003.38 Later, the 
division of labor and the relations thereof between the three parties 
including MoF were further clarified and formalized in the form of the 
tripartite MoU in June 2005. Sweden has thus quickly caught up with 
Norway by mid-2005 in terms of some important aspects in regulatory 
governance. 
In the United Kingdom, the 2006 revision of the tripartite MoU has 
brought in some changes in governance regarding the tripartite 
relationship. They include, for example, the HMT chairmanship of the 
Standing Committee both in normal times and in a crisis situation, in 
addition to the weakened role of BoE in the oversight of financial 
system. These changes represent more presence of HMT and less 
presence of BoE both in normal times and in a crisis. 
Considering collaborative practices between the financial authorities, 
together with their regulatory governance aspects, we assess that 
Norway ranks first, Sweden second, and the United Kingdom last, 
within our sample. Note that the validity of this assessment certainly 
passes the test of the current global financial crisis. We recall that 
there has been no news coming from either Norway or Sweden 
regarding any concerns about institutional collaboration during the 
crisis. Our review suggests that the recent malfunctioning of the 
sent to the Ministry of Finance.
38 As a result of the restructuring of Finansinspektionen, the Board of Directors, 
which had been an advisory body, became the decision-making authority within 
the institution. The Director General was no longer a member of the Board, let 
alone the Chair. Mr. Johan Altersten of Finansinspektionen informed the author 
of these and other changes by mail in June 2003.
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tripartite committee may have been attributed to those factors 
including: (i) the weakened role of BoE in financial stability since the 
revision of the tripartite MoU in 2006 and (ii) the form-over-substance 
approach to institutional collaboration.39 It is our view that the UK’s 
tripartite MoU should go through another revision in line with the 
strengthening of the BoE involvement in the oversight of systemic 
stability and that the UK’s financial authorities should make efforts to 
put substance and practice before form and procedure when they 
cooperate and coordinate. 
　
IV. The Experiences of Korea: The Review of the Special 
MoU
Korea is a laggard in institutional collaboration between the financial 
authorities. This fact has frequently been the focus of the media (e.g., 
JoongAng Ilbo 2008; Edaily 2009; Maeil Business Newspaper 2009, 
etc.), and is well documented in the literature (e.g., Kim 2004a, 2004b, 
2006; Kim and Yoon 2005; Kim and Lee 2006, etc.). In this section, we 
exemplify such institutional backwardness by way of reviewing the 
special MoU that covers cooperation and coordination between the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and the Bank of Korea (BOK) in a 
joint financial examination.40
39
Many critics argue that the faulty administrative design of the tripartite 
committee has been responsible for its malfunctioning during the crisis. 
Goodhart (2008) does not agree with such an argument. Goodhart (2008, p. 16) 
says that “[l]ack of foresight, lack of information, and human error can 
overwhelm any administrative design, however excellent.” This view is in line 
with what our review suggests regarding the possible factors that have 
underlain the malfunctioning of the tripartite relationships in the UK.
40
In addition, there are two more MoUs in which BOK has been involved. 
One is the special MoU agreed in February 2006 between FSS and BOK on a 
joint financial examination of FX transactions (FSS 2008). Since the way this 
MoU is stipulated is basically similar to the one we discuss in the paper, we do 
not review it. The other is the special MoU agreed in January 2004, between FSS, 
BOK and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), on the sharing of 
financial information (FSS 2008). According to the MoU, the Council for 
Financial Information Sharing, which consists of representatives at executives 
level from the three parties mentioned above, is supposed to meet twice a year 
to determine the set of principles on, and the scope and ways of, sharing the 
financial information. The working group is also supposed to exist to support 
the Council, and meets quarterly, plus whenever the need arises. Little is 
known in public about the activities of the Council and of the working group, 
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A joint examination has been considered as one of those channels 
for information sharing. There have however been pros and cons 
regarding this channel (Kim 2002). Some argue that conducting a joint 
examination should be costly both for the supervisor involved and the 
supervised. They thus say that the supervisory authority has only to 
provide the information it has obtained from conducting a financial 
examination with other financial authorities including the central bank. 
Others maintain that the benefits of conducting a joint examination 
should far outweigh the costs. According to them, the information 
indirectly available may not be always satisfactory to the eyes of the 
central bankers in terms of, say, substance, timeliness, and focus.41
Collaboration in financial examinations has been made for years 
between FSS and BOK. BOK is legally empowered, provided a certain 
condition is met,42 to request FSS to examine a financial institution 
and, if necessary, to require FSS to have BOK staff participate in a 
joint examination. BOK also has the power to request FSS to submit 
the findings from the examination which has been done by its request 
and, if necessary, to request FSS to take due corrective measures (BOK 
2008).43
Equipped with this set of powers, BOK has been increasingly involved, 
over the last decade, in the examination process of which FSS is in 
charge. In October 2002, the MoU on the joint examination was first 
agreed between FSS and BOK.44 The MoU has later been revised twice, 
in July 2004 and in July 2007, for improvement of some technicalities 
(FSS 2008).
The current version of the MoU begins with clarifying its objectives 
except that institutional tension has often been highlighted in the process of 
information sharing.
41
The Federal Reserve has long been on the camp that argues for its direct 
involvement in examining its member state banks and banking organizations. 
For details, see Peek et al. (1999).
42
The relevant condition is “when the Monetary Policy Committee deems it 
[i.e., the request] necessary for the implementation of its monetary and credit 
policies ....” See Article 88 of the Bank of Korea Act (Bank of Korea 2008).
43 KDIC has been similarly empowered as well. We do not discuss the KDIC- 
FSS relationship in the paper.
44 FSS (2008) states that both the duplication of examination efforts and 
unnecessary burdens on the financial institutions have led to the conclusion of 
the MoU. Note however that BOK simply denies this view. According to BOK 
(2009, p. 55), “the MoU was concluded to help remove the tension that had 
been created by non-cooperative attitude on the part of FSS.”
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and the distinct focuses of each authority in the conduct of the joint 
examination as follows (FSS 2008): 
　
∙Objectives: “Both FSS and BOK make efforts to conduct joint 
examinations adequately by taking financial and economic 
circumstances and regulatory burden on financial institutions into 
account, and to minimize the workload of financial institutions by 
information sharing.” 
∙Focuses: “In process of a joint examination, FSS focuses on 
establishing a sound credit system and fair practices in financial 
transactions and on protecting financial consumers, whereas BOK 
focuses on conducting monetary policy in accordance with the 
purpose and scope of the joint examination as requested to FSS.”
　
The current MoU elaborates on the general procedures for, and the 
methods of, planning, coordinating, and conducting a joint examination, 
and on post-examination actions that BOK may follow up if necessary, 
thereby specifying how FSS and BOK are expected to interact. A joint 
examination working group is stipulated to work out practical matters 
ensuing from BOK-requested joint examinations. 
The acute problem with this Korean special MoU is that word is 
often not as good as deed. For example, a joint examination working 
group has been seldom set up in practice to begin with.45 This implies 
that there has been almost an absence of pre-examination collaboration 
and that there has been no post-examination mechanism to resolve 
differences in views, if any, between FSS and BOK. Worse than all, 
deep-rooted institutional distrust has dominated the joint examination 
process for years.46
45 The author has learned this from the informed sources of BOK in May 
2009.
46 The parliamentary process concerning the revision of the Bank of Korea Act 
during March-April 2009 provided yet another occasion to witness this very 
distrust. For example, BOK Governor was then reported to bring to light, before 
the Committee of Strategy and Finance in the National Assembly, several 
instances in which BOK had not been able to get access to the pertinent 
information due to discords with FSS over joint examinations (Edaily 2009). 
This divulgence of the acute circumstance has led to the recent efforts within 
policy circles to enhance institutional cooperation and coordination over joint 
examinations and information sharing (Maeil Business Newspaper 2009). Note 
that the IMF’s earlier remark made on the basis of its FSAP work for Korea is 
still as effective as it was six years from now (IMF 2003b, p.30): “[T]here is a 
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V. Concluding Remarks
We have reviewed the general MoUs agreed between the financial 
authorities in the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden, respectively, 
and the special MoU on financial examinations agreed between FSS 
and BOK in Korea. In terms of collaborative practices between the 
financial authorities and regulatory governance aspects of cooperation 
and coordination, these four countries can be graded in order of 
precedence as follows: Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Korea. 
Tentative interpretations of this finding in terms of the legal tradition 
and the political culture, are provided as follows.
First, consider the legal tradition. The MoU can be thought of as a 
means to expounding contractual obligations and well-defined procedures 
and enforcing them on the financial authorities involved. In this sense, 
the operational effectiveness of the MoU may be closely related, in 
some way or other, to the general quality of law enforcement in the 
country in question. Viewed this way, our finding from the review may 
be understood in a broader context of the country-specific legal 
tradition. Our assessment of the country-specific performance in terms 
of institutional collaboration is consistent to what La Porta et al. (1998) 
have found.47 According to them, the Scandinavian countries 
(Scandinavian family) and the German-civil law countries (German 
family) rank first in terms of the quality of law enforcement. In 
particular, the quality of law enforcement has turned out the highest 
in Norway in their sample of 49 countries. Sweden ranks slightly lower 
than Norway. It is interesting that the United Kingdom ranks high in 
the English common-law countries (English family), whereas South 
Korea ranks bottom in the German family.48
Second, consider the political culture. Openness and transparency, 
need for the BOK and the FSS to strengthen their information sharing 
arrangements.”
47
La Porta et al. (1998) have measured the general quality of law enforcement 
using such a set of proxies as “efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation ..., and likelihood of contract repudiation by 
the government.” They have classified 49 countries in their sample into four 
families by the legal origin: English, French, German, and Scandinavian families.
48
The scores given each country in the quality of law enforcement were 
reported as follows (full scores＝50): Norway (49.59); Sweden (48.98); United 
Kingdom (47.01); and Korea (33.55). See La Porta et al. (1998) for further details.
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having been traditionally embedded in the political culture of the 
Scandinavian countries (Taylor and Fleming 1999),49 are among the 
fundamental virtues that the financial authorities are supposed to have 
in common for smoother collaboration. In their political culture, “decision- 
makers recognize the legitimacy of public scrutiny of their decisions”  
(Taylor and Fleming 1999, p. 29). It is this open and transparent 
social climate that must have contributed much to enhancing 
institutional cooperation and coordination in both Norway and Sweden. 
In stark contrast, the public sector in Korea is known to be notoriously 
closed-minded and opaque (Kim 2008). In particular, the credit-card 
fiasco in 2003-4 turned out to be caused by a supervisory failure 
which resulted in turn from a virtual lack of supervisory cooperation 
and coordination on the part of the financial authorities (Kim 2004a). 
In short, the political culture in a country and the social climate 
engendered by it, are responsible at least in part for how well the 
financial authorities therein work to collaborate with each other. 
Now we turn to institutional collaboration through an on-site joint 
examination. In fact, that the financial authorities do cooperate through 
it in some countries while they do not in others. For example, such a 
channel of cooperation is explicitly mentioned in the current MoUs of 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Korea, and the United States, whereas no 
such mention is found in those of Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Financial System Stability 
Department of the Bank of Korea 2007). In the former group of 
countries, there exist some differences in the way each country makes 
use of the channel. For example, the United States and Germany are 
on the more active side than others in the group. In the latter group, 
there is certainly a complete absence of it in practice, except for 
Norway.50 This overall picture may be interpreted as implying that there 
are widely-varying degrees, depending on an individual country, of 
49
In this respect, Sweden is most outstanding. Sweden is the first country all 
over the world that put forward ‘open government’ in law (Freedom of the Press 
Act of 1766). This was exactly 200 years ahead of the Freedom of Information 
Act of 1966 in the United States. In Sweden and in Norway, all the information 
concerning government administration has long been open to the public unless 
forbidden by law (Secrecy Act) for some particular reasons (Kim 2006).
50 Mr. Arild J. Lund of Norges Bank has recently informed the author via 
email that an on-site joint inspection is done, if ever, “on a totally voluntary 
basis” at the request of Norges Bank, which “take[s] part in [on-site] inspections 
... only for the purpose of expertise buildup ... [and] not in order to get first 
hand information about the situation in a specific institution.” 
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perceived substitutability between the on-site joint examination and 
other arrangements of institutional collaboration. 
Finally, some words for Korea. So far as institutional collaboration is 
concerned, the Korean financial authorities certainly have a long way 
to go. It is quite unusual for a country having operated the regime of 
integrated financial supervision to do without the general MoU for more 
than a decade. The consequence is that many of those methods and 
arrangements usually used in foreign countries with integrated financial 
supervision remain uninstalled and unexploited at all in Korea. In 
particular, the complete lack of any formal, legally-based tripartite 
machinery or of any unified set of protocols for crisis management 
bears mute witness to how serious the problems have been. What is 
worse, bureaucracy seems to dominate the process of a joint examina- 
tion, often generating mutual distrust and tension between FSS and 
BOK. This may be partly because the joint examination channel, which 
has been virtually the only effective form of institutional collaboration, 
tends to get easily overburdened. 
Given these dire circumstances in Korea, interagency collaboration is 
not an issue to tinker with. Instead, it is an issue that requires a 
serious and fundamental treatment. Although the legal tradition and 
the political culture are largely predetermined, there must be a way 
out. With financial stability in mind, Kim (2008, 2009) has recently 
put forward the strong case for the public sector governance reform in 
Korea. Institutional collaboration between the financial authorities is, 
by nature, a holistic matter after all. The issue could be successfully 
dealt with only in such a broader context.
　
(Received 27 April 2009; Revised 5 August 2009)
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